Baby without a Country: Determining Citizenship for Assisted Reproduction Children Born Overseas by Knaplund, Kristine S.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 91 Issue 2 Article 4 
December 2020 
Baby without a Country: Determining Citizenship for Assisted 
Reproduction Children Born Overseas 
Kristine S. Knaplund 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Kristine S. Knaplund, Baby without a Country: Determining Citizenship for Assisted Reproduction Children 
Born Overseas, 91 Denv. U. L. Rev. 335 (2014). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please 
contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
BABY WITHOUT A COUNTRY: DETERMINING CITIZENSHIP





The United States has long followed the English common law view
that citizenship can be attained at birth in two ways: by being born in the
U.S. (jus soli) or by being born abroad as the child of a U.S. citizen (jus
sanguinis). For a child born abroad to claim citizenship throughjus san-
guinis, the State Department for many years required proof of a blood
relationship between the child and a U.S. citizen. While a genetic test
serves this purpose for children conceived coitally, advances in assisted
reproduction techniques (ART) that have separated the two functions of a
birth mother-namely gestation and genetics-have greatly complicated
the definition of parentage. In modem times this has led to unjust results,
including the recent denial of U.S. citizenship to children born to Ameri-
can mothers who used donated eggs to conceive and give birth abroad.
While the State Department has recently modified its regulations to allow
the woman giving birth to claim maternity despite the lack of a genetic
tie, in many cases it continues to use a parentage standard that dates back
to 1952, when assisted reproduction techniques such as in vitro fertiliza-
tion or the use of donated gametes had not yet been developed. This Ar-
ticle seeks to propose a workable solution to the question of citizenship
for children born overseas to American parents via ART. It first explores
the origins of jus sanguinis in Roman and English common law along
with ancient and medieval views of conception and maternity, and exam-
ines three prevailing methods to determine parentage: the parturient test,
genetic test, and parental intent test. Ultimately the Article recommends
that the State Department acknowledge advances in ART, and the differ-
ent ways children are nowadays conceived, by altering its jus sanguinis
policy to allow several presumptions of parentage to apply.
t Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. The Author wishes to
acknowledge the outstanding work of her research assistants, Scott Tarbell, Mia Getlin, and Jeffrey
Bits, and research librarians Jennifer Allison and Alyssa Thurston. Thanks also go to the Dean's
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INTRODUCTION
The United States has long followed the English common law view
that citizenship can be attained at birth in two ways: by being born in the
United States (jus soli) or by being born abroad as the child of a U.S.
citizen (jus sanguinis). The first, jus soli, is now part of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: "All persons born or naturalized in
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside."1 Jus soli theoreti-
cally does not inquire into the citizenship of the child's parents; the rele-
vant fact is that the birth takes place in the United States.2 Jus sanguinis,
in contrast, arises from the parent-child relationship. The State Depart-
ment translates jus sanguinis as "the law of the bloodline," citing it as a
traditional "concept of Roman or civil law." 3 By "natural parent," the
State Department usually means a blood relationship with a U.S. citizen:
"It is not enough that the child is presumed to be the issue of the parents'
marriage by the laws of the jurisdiction where the child was born."
Jus sanguinis, involving proof of a blood relationship to one's child,
works well for children conceived the old fashioned way, through coi-
tus-a blood test or DNA test will easily confirm the parentage of the
child in the vast majority of cases. But the matter is far more complicated
for those who have used donated sperm or ova to achieve a pregnancy;
I. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
2. Despite the language of the Fourteenth Amendment, Native Americans were not accorded
birthright citizenship until 1924, on the theory that the Indian tribes were an independent sovereign
and therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. John Rockwell Snowden et al.,
American Indian Sovereignty and Naturalization: It's a Race Thing, 80 NEB. L. REV. 171, 182-83
(2001).
3. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, 7 FAM § 111 .a(2) (2012), available
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86755.pdf. The American Philosophical Society's
Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law defines jus (ius) sanguinis as "[the rights of blood (blood
ties = [cognatio]). They 'cannot be destroyed by any civil law."' 43 ADOLF BERGER, AM.
PHILOSOPHICAL SoC'Y, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW pt. 2, at 533 (1953). Cognatio
is defined as "[b]lood relationship." Id. at 393.
4. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, 7 FAM § 1131.4-I .a (2010).
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the man who intends to be the child's father, or the woman who will act
as the child's mother, may lack a blood relationship to the child. In such
a case, when donated gametes (sperm or ova) are used, the State Depart-
ment always considers the child to be born out of wedlock, even if the
intended parents are married, and until a recent change in the website,
required proof of the blood or genetic relationship by clear and convinc-
ing evidence.5
A purely genetic connection to the child is sufficient to establish
parentage in relatively few instances in American law. One is child sup-
port: even if the genetic father has had no contact with the child, and has
done nothing to establish a relationship (or has even been prevented from
knowing about the child), the genetic connection may be enough if no
other presumed father is on the scene.6 As Theresa Glennon notes, "The
child support system for children born out of wedlock is based on the
assumption that biological fatherhood is a sufficient basis for legal and
financial responsibility for a child.",7 The rationale is that, once a man has
engaged in a sexual relationship, he has a responsibility to provide for
any children born out of that encounter.
8
This Article explores a second instance in which the genetic con-
nection is paramount: when an American citizen gives birth abroad. Over
7 million Americans live abroad, and more than 65 million travel abroad
annually.9 Some Americans are venturing abroad specifically for infer-
tility treatments because of lower costs at foreign clinics and the willing-
ness of clinics to treat older patients.'0 The result: in Fiscal Year 2012,
the State Department "registered 64,991 overseas births to U.S. par-
ents."'  However, citizenship has recently been denied to the children of
two American women who used anonymously donated gametes to con-
5. See id. § 1133.4-2; Scott Titshaw, Sorry Ma'am, Your Baby Is an Alien: Outdated Immi-
gration Rules and Assisted Reproductive Technology, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 47, 122, 129-30
(2010) (illustrating the State Department's genetic essentialist approach to determining the citizen-
ship of children conceived through assisted reproductive technology). The State Department recently
changed its website to state that "a U.S. citizen mother must be either the genetic or the gestational
and legal mother of the child at the time and place of the child's birth." U.S. Dep't of State, Im-
portant Information for U.S. Citizens Considering the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology
(ART) Abroad, TRAVEL.STATE.GOv, http://travel.state.gov/content/travel/english/legal-
considerations/us-citizenship-laws-policies/assisted-reproductive-technology.htmI (last visited May
15, 2014).
6. Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption
of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547, 558 (2000).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, WHO WE ARE AND WHAT WE
Do: CONSULAR AFFAIRS BY THE NUMBERS (Jan. 2013), available at
http://travel.state.gov/pdf/ca fact sheet.pdf.
10. Heather Won Tesoriero, Infertile Couples Head Overseas for Treatments-Clinics in
Thailand, Canada, Israel Tout Cheaper In-Vitro; Checking up on Success Rates, WALL ST. J., Feb.
19, 2008, at Dl; M. Susan Wilson, US. Women Crossing Globe for Fertility Help, NBC
NEWS.cOM, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/1 9100571/ns/health-pregnancy/t/us-women-crossing-
globe-fertility-help (last updated June 13, 2007, 09:47 EST).
11. BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, supra note 9.
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ceive and give birth to a child: one in Israel12 and one in Switzerland;13 in
a third case, the U.S. Embassy refused to recognize the birth mother as
the child's mother because she had used donated eggs and given birth to
the child in India.'4 At least in these cases each woman knew that the
child to whom she had given birth was not genetically linked to her. The
State Department warns travelers:
The Department is aware of cases of foreign fertility clinics that have
substituted alternate donor sperm and eggs when the U.S. parents'
genetic material turned out not to be viable. The undisclosed switch
was revealed when the Post requested DNA tests as part of the pro-
cess of documenting the child's citizenship for the purposes of issu-
ing a passport. Such situations can have the unfortunate consequence
of leaving children stateless. 15
Part I of this Article discusses the origins ofjus sanguinis in Roman
and English common law, including ancient and medieval views of con-
ception and maternity in determining the child's bloodline. Not surpris-
ingly, these views differ significantly from those held today. Taking into
account this scientific background, Part II discusses citizenship laws in
early U.S. history and assumptions about who were the parents of a
child, both in wedlock and out of wedlock. While the definition of pater-
nity has always taken note of biology as well as a man's relationship to
the birth mother, science began to play a more prominent role in the legal
definition of parenthood once blood grouping and blood tests were avail-
able starting in the early 1900s. Part III then introduces the law of U.S.
citizenship today, which in its main outlines is the same as first codified
in 1952. The ability of DNA testing to positively identify the father in
most cases, plus advances in assisted reproductive technology (ART) that
separate the two functions of the birth mother-genetics and gestation-
have greatly complicated the definition of parentage for children, but the
State Department has, in large part, continued to use the same parentage
12. Sarah Elizabeth Richards, Mother Country: The Perils of Getting an Assist Abroad on
Having a Baby-for Americans and Foreigners Both, SLATE (Mar. 27, 2012, 4:02 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/double-x/doublex/2012/03/fertility-tourism theperils of having a
babyabroad with assisted reproduction technology_.html.
13. Conversation with Congressman Eliot L. Engel of New York, U.S. House of Representa-
tives (Aug. 2, 2012) (notes on file with author) (discussing how Congressman Engel's office suc-
cessfully helped the constituent gain citizenship for her child in January 2013, just before the child's
first birthday); Letter from Congressman Eliot L. Engel of New York, U.S. House of Representa-
tives, to Hillary Clinton, Sec'y of State (July 10, 2012) (on file with author); E-mail from Brian
Skretny, Legislative Dir., Office of Congressman Eliot Engel, to author (Jan. 25, 2013, 10:18 AM)
(on file with author) (stating that child was granted citizenship prior to first birthday).
14. Jaya Menon, In the Womb of Controversy, TIMES INDIA (Jan. 25, 2010, 04:59 IST),
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-01-25/chennai/28133900 I egg-donation-
consulate-donor-eggs. In such a case, where only the egg and not the sperm has been donated, the
child may be able to obtain U.S. citizenship at birth if the father is a U.S. citizen. Id.
15. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 5. The child bom in Switzerland, for example, was offi-
cially stateless at birth because Switzerland does not recognize jus soli. Conversation with Con-
gressman Eliot L. Engel of New York, U.S. House of Representatives (Aug. 2, 2012) (notes on file
with author).
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standard first detailed in 1952. Part IV examines and critiques three
methods of identifying parentage to determine which should be used for
children born abroad: the State Department's preferred method (genet-
ics), the common law parturient test (the woman who gives birth is the
mother), and the recently developed intent test (those who intend to raise
the child are the parents). In Part V, the Article concludes that our citi-
zenship rules for children born abroad must acknowledge the different
ways in which children are conceived and develop definitions of parent-
age that will avoid the unjust results noted in this Article.
I. WHERE Do BABIES COME FROM?
A. Greek and Roman Views of Parentage
The ancient Greeks and Romans shared two competing views on the
mother's role in creating a child but generally agreed that, whatever her
contribution, it was less important than the man's.16 Most Greeks and
Romans followed the teachings of Aristotle,17 who articulated the "one
seed" theory in which the man provides the "movement and definition'
'18
while the woman provides the nutriment.19 Contributions by both male
and female were necessary, in Aristotle's view, but "birth must take
place in the female" because she "contains the matter out of which the
product is fashioned.,20 While Aristotle acknowledged that women could
become pregnant without experiencing orgasm, more often "the opposite
is the case" since the orgasm provided a means to draw the semen into
the uterus.21 A second view among a minority of Greeks and Romans
was based on Hippocrates, who propounded the "two-seed" theory.22 In
16. See Nancy Tuana, The Weaker Seed: The Sexist Bias of Reproductive Theory, 3 HYPATIA
35, 41 (1988) ("Although such theorists [including Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Hippocrates, and
Parmenides] gave woman a role in the creation of the form as well as the material of the fetus, they
uniformly held that woman's contribution was weaker than that of man.").
17. VERN L. BULLOUGH, SCIENCE IN THE BEDROOM: A HISTORY OF SEX RESEARCH 12-13
(1994). Aristotle lived from 384 to 322 B.C. Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.), INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.edu/aristotl/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
18. ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTLE DE PARTIBUS ANIMALIUM I AND DE GENERATIONE ANIMALIUM I
51, 54 (D. M. Balme trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1992).
19. Id. at 50.
20. Id. at 54.
21. THOMAS LAQUEUR, MAKING SEX: BODY AND GENDER FROM THE GREEKS TO FREUD 48
(1990) (quoting ARISTOTLE, ON THE GENERATION OF ANIMALS bk. 2 ch. 4 § 739a[20]-[35]). Others
wrote that orgasm was a sign of conception: the physician to Justinian believed that women who
were raped were sterile, "while those 'in love conceive very often."' Id. at 49 (quoting AETIOS OF
AMIDA: THE GYNAECOLOGY AND OBSTETRICS OF THE VI CENTURY, A.D. 36 (James V. Ricci trans.,
1950)). That debate has resurfaced today with the remarks of Representative Todd Akin that rape
rarely results in pregnancy because "[i]f it's a legitimate rape, the female body has ways to try to
shut the whole thing down." Lori Moore, The Statement and the Reaction, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21,
2012, at A 13 (internal quotation mark omitted).
22. BULLOUGH, supra note 17, at 12 13; see also Yii-Jan Singh, Semen, Philosophy, and
Paul, 4 J. PHIL. & SCRIPTURE 32, 35 n.14 (2007), available at
http://www.philosophyandscripture.org/Issue4-2/Singh.pdf (referencing the two-seed theory). Hip-
pocrates lived from 450 to 380 B.C. Michael Boylan, Hippocrates (c.450-c.380 B.C.E.), INTERNET
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.edu/hippocra/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). Galen lived
from 130 to 200 C.E. and "was one of the most prominent ancient physicians." Michael Boylan,
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Hippocrates' view, both the man and the woman produced sperm which
then mixed together to create a child
just as though one were to mix together beeswax and suet,
using a larger quantity of the suet than of the beeswax, and
melt them together over a fire. While the mixture is still flu-
id, the prevailing character of the mixture is not apparent:
only after it solidifies can it be seen that the suet prevails
quantitatively over the wax. And it is just the same with the
male and female forms of the sperm.
23
As early as the sixth century, Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis assert-
ed that "the mother is certain" (mater semper certa est); 24 the issue was
identifying the father. Roman law allowed the husband to dispute pater-
nity of a child borne by his wife, but in a limited way: Once the wife
gave notice to her husband that she was pregnant, his role was "then ei-
ther to send guards or to give notice to her that she is not pregnant by
him .... [U]nless he sends guards or replies giving her notice she is not
pregnant by him, the husband is compelled to acknowledge the off-
spring.,25 The guards were "[p]robably... meant to prevent a change-
ling child from being passed off as the" husband's child.26 Thus, in some
cases in ancient Rome, a child might lack a blood relationship to a man
designated as his father because he was married to the woman who gave
birth.
B. Parentage Under English Common Law: Laying the Groundwork for
the United States
As with the Romans and the Greeks, English common law empha-
sized the role of the male in conception. St. Thomas Aquinas27 supported
the Aristotelian view that man's seed provided the form, while the wom-
Galen (130-200 C.E.), INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.edu/galen/ (last visited
Mar. 25, 2014).
23. LAQUEUR, supra note 21, at 39 (quoting HIPPOCRATES & lAIN M. LONIE, THE
HIPPOCRATIC TREATISES "ON GENERATION," "ON THE NATURE OF THE CHILD," "DISEASES IV": A
COMMENTARY 3-4 (1981)).
24. Cindy L. Baldassi, Mater Est Quam Gestatio Demonstrat: A Cautionary Tale 3 (June 27,
2007) (unnumbered working paper, Univ. of B.C. Faculty of Law Working Papers Series) (quoting
GEORGE BLAXLAND, CODEX LEGUM ANGLICANARUM: OR, A DIGEST OF PRINCIPLES OF ENGLISH
LAW, ARRANGED IN THE ORDER OF THE CODE NAPOLEON 292 (1903)) (citing I THE DIGEST OF
JUSTINIAN 44 (Alan Watson ed., 1985)), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-927147. Justinian,
born in 482 A.D., reigned from 527 to 565. Sarah Brooks, The Byzantine State Under Justinian I
(Justinian the Great), METROPOLITAN MUSEUM ART,
http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/just/hdjust.htm (last updated Apr. 2009).
25. BRUCE W. FRIER & THOMAS A.J. MCGINN, A CASEBOOK ON ROMAN FAMILY LAW 105
(2004).
26. Id
27. St. Thomas was born in 1225 and died in 1274 A.D. Ralph Mclnerny & John
O'Callaghan, Saint Thomas Aquinas, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aquinas/ (last updated Sept. 30, 2009); Thomas Aquinas (1225-
1274), INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (May 6, 2009), http://www.iep.utm.edu/aquinas/.
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an supplied the "corporeal matter."28 In the seventeenth century, the two-
seed theory re-emerged in midwife manuals. While most still believed
that the woman's role in creating the child was solely passive, Nicholas
Culpeper29 revived interest in Hippocrates' two-seed theory by pro-
pounding the "radical" idea that the woman contributed with an egg.30 In
Culpeper's view, "the woman spends her seed as well as the man, and
both are united to make conception."31 Another English writer at the
time, Jane Sharp, likewise believed that the woman released her seed in
orgasm, uniting with the male seed to become pregnant.32 Later in the
seventeenth century a new theory emerged: the preformation doctrine,
which held that the embryo contained a complete miniature person who
was nourished in the uterus in order to grow.33 Debate ensued over
whether this miniature person was contained in man's semen (animal-
culism) or woman's egg (ovism). 34 In the 1670s Leeuwenhoek35 sided
with animalculism by using a crude microscope to observe that semen
contained millions of animalcules,
36 which he termed spermatozoa.
37
"Echoing centuries of tradition, Leeuwenhoek insisted that the nourish-
ment of the masculine seed was the sole function of the female.,38 In
1694 Hartsoeker published a drawing of a drop of sperm containing a
tiny person, representing what he believed was contained in the semen.39
28. Tuana, supra note 16, at 46 (quoting THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1:98:2
(Fathers of the English Dominican Provinces trans., 1947)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
29. Nicholas Culpeper, an English physician (1616-1654), published his A Directory for
Midwives in 1651 to revive the two-seed theory. See Dylan Warren Davis, Nicholas Culpeper:
Herbalist of the People, SKYSCRIPT.CO.UK (Jan. 2005), http://www.skyscript.co.uk/culpeper.html.
30. Olav Thulesius, Nicholas Culpeper, Father of English Midwifery, 87 J. ROYAL SOC'Y
MED. 552, 554 (1994).
31. Id.
32. Elaine Hobby, "Secrets of the Female Sex ": Jane Sharp, the Reproductive Female Body,
and Early Modern Midwifery Manuals, 8 WOMEN'S WRITING 201, 202-03 (2001). Jane Sharp, a
midwife for over thirty years, was one of the first women to publish a book on her profession: The
Midwives Book: Or, the Whole Art of Midwify Discovered was published in 1671. Id. at 201, 209.
33. Ava Chamberlain, The Immaculate Ovum: Jonathan Edwards and the Construction of the
Female Body, 57 WM. & MARY Q. 289, 298 (2000).
34. Id. at 298-99.
35. Antony van Leeuwenhoek was a fabric maker who built his own microscopes to be the
first to observe bacteria and other organisms. Antony van Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723), U. CAL.
MUSEUM PALEONTOLOGY, www.ucmp.berkeley.edu/history/leeuwenhoek.htmi (last visited Mar. 26,
2014).
36. LAQUEUR, supra note 21, at 171.
37. BULLOUGH, supra note 17, at 15.
38. Tuana, supra note 16, at 53.
39. Id. at 54. Nicolaas Hartsoeker (1656-1725) published the pencil sketch in Essai de Diop-
trique in 1694. Cera R. Lawrence, Nicolaas Hartsoeker, EMBRYO PROJECT ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://embryo.asu.edu/pages/nicolaas-hartsoeker (last modified Sept. 25, 2013).
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This material is reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. and also appears in Nancy Tuana's article The Weaker Seed: The
Sexist Bias of Reproductive Theory.
40
40. Tuana, supra note 16, at 54.
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A century later, Erasmus Darwin (grandfather of Charles Darwin)4' stat-
ed that the man supplied the form of the embryo, while the woman pro-
42vided the oxygen and the food. Astute observers wondered why some
children strongly resembled their mothers, if in fact only the father pro-
vided the blueprint, but science had an answer for that as well: a concave
impression that resembles the woman is in the "little nich[e] of the ova of
women," creating a mold to form the face of the child.43
As the science developed on conception and parentage, England had
several ways to determine citizenship at birth. As early as 1351, a statute
allowed children born abroad to English parents to be considered natural-
born English subjects, adhering to the principle ofjus sanguinis.44 After
King James VI of Scotland became King James I of England in 1603, the
question arose whether children born in Scotland after the "union of the
crowns" were English citizens.45 The decision in Calvin's Case in 1608
by the King's Bench, Common Pleas justices, the Lord Chancellor, and
the barons of the Exchequer-fourteen judges in all-was that they were,
thus confirming jus soli in English law.46 Those born in Scotland before
1603, such as Calvin's parents, were still Scottish subjects, not English.47
Thus, Calvin's Case expressed the common law view that the place of
birth, regardless of one's blood, could be a factor in determining citizen-
ship. As Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, held,
Every one born within the dominions of the King of Eng-
land, whether here or in his colonies or dependencies, being
under the protection of-therefore, according to our
common law, owes allegiance to--the King and is subject
to all the duties and entitled to enjoy all the rights and liber-
ties of an Englishman. 
48
41. Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802), U. CAL. MUSEUM PALEONTOLOGY,
www.ucmp.berkeley.edu/history/Edarwin.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2014). His book, Zoonomia, or,
The Laws of Organic Life (1794-1796), suggested a theory of evolution that his grandson later fully
developed. Id.
42. Tuana, supra note 16, at 55.
43. Id. at 56 (quoting 3 JEAN ASTRUC, A TREATISE ON THE DISEASES OF WOMEN 47-48
(1762)).
44. Polly J. Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin's Case (1608), 9 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 73, 83 (1997) (citing De Natis Ultra Mare, 1350, 25 Edw. 3, c. 2 (Eng.)).
45. Id. at 80.
46. Id. at 80-83.
47. Id. at 82-83.
48. Id. (quoting HERBERT BROOM, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW VIEWED IN RELATION TO COMMON
LAW, AND EXEMPLIFIED BY CASES 31 (George L. Denman, 2d ed. 1885). The United Kingdom
continued to recognizejus soli until 1981. See Naturalization Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 14, § 4
(Eng.); British Nationality Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 56, § 4 (Eng.). The British Nationality Act
of 1981 changed the law by requiring that one of the child's parents be a British citizen even though
the child was born on British soil. British Nationality Act, 1981, c. 61, §§ 1, 3 (Eng.).
2014]
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II. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND SCIENCE, 1790 TO THE 1950s
When the Unites States was first formed, the definition of citizen-
ship was left to the individual states.49 Thomas Jefferson, then-Governor
of Virginia, crafted a statute enacted by his state in 1779 determining that
"all white persons born within the territory of this commonwealth"
would be citizens.5° In 1787, the U.S. Constitution granted Congress the
authority "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,"51 which was
exercised by the first Congress at its Second Session in 1790.52 The 1790
Act, in addition to allowing "any alien" who was "a free white person" to
apply for citizenship after residing here for two years, provided:
[T]he children of citizens of the United States, that may be born be-
yond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered
as natural born citizens: Provided, That the right of citizenship shall
not descend to persons whose fathers have never been resident in the
United States .... 53
In 1795, the 1790 Act was repealed and replaced by a similar provi-
sion to provide citizenship for children born abroad.54 At that time, when
Congress first considered citizenship for those born abroad, it was not
possible for the birth mother to be anything other than the genetic mother
of the child. Whatever her role-whether she contributed some of the
seed for the child or merely nourished and housed a preformed child-
she was the mother because she had given birth. The "ancient" Latin
maxim translated as "the mother is demonstrated by gestation" was
coined in 1983,55 but until the advent of in vitro fertilization in the twen-
tieth century, the definition of maternity was universally accepted. In any
event, the mother of a child born abroad could not transmit citizenship at
birth to her child. Like the 1790 and 1795 statutes, citizenship laws en-
acted in 180256 and 185557 required the child's father to be a resident of
49. Price, supra note 44, at 141. See also United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 655
(1898) ('The [C]onstitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must
be had elsewhere to ascertain that."' (quoting Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 167 (1874)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
50. James Brown Scott, Nationality: Jus Soli or Jus Sanguinis, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 58, 62
(1930) (referring to the Act of May 3, 1779, ch. 55, 1882 Va. Acts 129).
51. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
52. Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815,823 (1971).
53. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, 103-04 (creating uniform rules for naturaliza-
tion).
54. Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414, 414-15 (establishing uniform rules for naturali-
zation). The 1795 Act deleted the reference to a child "born beyond sea," but was otherwise nearly
identical to the 1790 Act in requiring the child's father to be a resident of the United States. Compare
id. § 3 ("[T]he children of citizens of the United States, born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the
United States, shall be considered as citizens of the United States."), with Act of Mar. 26, 1790, § I
("[T]he children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of
the United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens.").
55. Baldassi, supra note 24, at 6 (quoting U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT,
INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES 282 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, 2 Stat. 153. The Naturalization Act of 1802 provided that
"the children of persons who now are, or have been citizens of the United States, shall, though born
[Vol. 91:2
BABY WITHOUT A COUNTRY
the United States but made no mention of the mother.58 In 1907, Con-
gress mandated that when a woman married a non-U.S. citizen, she lost
her U.S. citizenship.59 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the statute's ap-
plication to a woman who never resided abroad with her alien (British)
husband on the grounds that "[t]he identity of husband and wife is an
ancient principle of our jurisprudence.,60 The 1907 Act was later nar-
rowed by the 1922 Cable Act to automatically strip the wife of U.S. citi-
zenship only in cases where she married an alien ineligible for citizen-
ship,61 thus allowing many U.S. citizens with alien husbands to retain
their citizenship. Still, the foreign-born children of a U.S. mother and an
alien father were not eligible for citizenship at birth until 1934 when
Congress amended the statute to include a child "whose father or mother
or both at the time of the birth of such child is a citizen of the United
States" and to require either the citizen father or the citizen mother to
reside in the United States before "the birth of such child."62 As one
commentator noted, as of the 1934 Act:
[T]he foreign born children of a Chinese or Japanese woman born in
the United States would now be American. This is by way of sex
equality, however, not racial equality since previously the children of
no American woman, whatever her race, were American by virtue of
her nationality. Even under the present law if the native born Ameri-
can woman of Japanese or Chinese decent were to have children born
abroad by a husband racially ineligible to become a United States cit-
izen it is not clear that they would have American nationality or be
entitled to enter the United States.
63
Thus, in early U.S. history, and until 1934, the critical question in
determining citizenship for a child born abroad was the identity of the
child's father. If the mother was married, her husband was presumed to
out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, be considered as citizens of the United States:
Provided, that the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never resided
within the United States." Id. § 4.
57. Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, 10 Stat. 604. An article published in 1853 had pointed out
that, by the terms of the April 1802 law, only parents who were U.S. citizens on or before April 14,
1802, could transmit U.S. citizenship to their children bom abroad. The Alienage of the United
States, 2 AM. L. REG. 193, 193 (1854); see also Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 663-64 (1927)
(discussing Binney's analysis of the 1802 law and the citizenship of children bom abroad). The 1855
Act corrected this glitch by allowing persons "whose fathers were or shall be at the time of their
birth citizens of the United States" to transmit citizenship to their children born abroad. See § 1, 10
Stat. at 604.
58. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 461-62 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing
statutes determining citizenship for a child based upon the father's residence).
59. Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228, 1229.
60. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915).
61. Act of Sept. 22, 1922, ch. 411, § 3, 42 Stat. 1021, 1022. An alien ineligible for citizenship
referred to "the statutory exclusion of Asians from immigration eligibility." Kristin A. Collins, A
Short History of Sex and Citizenship: The Historians' Amicus Brief in Flores-Villar v. United States,
91 B.U. L. REV. 1485, 1492 (2011).
62. Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, § 1,48 Stat. 797, 797 (emphasis added).
63. Lester B. Orfield, The Citizenship Act of 1934, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 99, 116 (1934)..
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be the father-a principle followed in Roman times64 and in English
common law.65 If the mother was unmarried, the child had no legally
declared father or mother from whom to inherit66 and could not claim
U.S. citizenship through either parent. Children born abroad to a U.S.
father and an alien secondary wife in a polygamous marriage, for exam-
ple, were considered illegitimate and thus ineligible forjus sanguinis.6 7
Even with the marital presumption, an element of biology had long
been part of the paternity determination. As early as the 1700s, the Eng-
lish common law provided that if the husband was "beyond the seas" at
the relevant time, for example, he could challenge a finding that he was
the father.68 Science took a long time to ascertain when the "relevant
time" was, however. Fluger demonstrated in 1861 that menstruation
ceased in women whose ovaries were removed, and speculated "that
menstruation and ovulation occurred simultaneously."69 As late as the
1890s, American doctors were still unsure how ovulation was triggered
and its connection to menstruation;70 the relationship of hormones to
ovulation was not detailed until the 1930s.71 Thus, evidence to include or
exclude a particular man as the father consisted of testimony regarding
access to the woman, but until the 1930s, such testimony focused on the
wrong time: the period of menstruation rather than ovulation.
The advent of blood testing provided a scientific means to identify,
initially, who was not the father. In 1901, Dr. Karl Landsteiner an-
nounced his theories on blood groups, along with the suggestion that the
groupings could be used in cases of disputed paternity, and in 1909 clas-
sified human blood into the groups still used today: A, B, AB, and 0.72
These new tests could only be used to exclude a man as the father.73 For
example, if the mother's blood was group A and the child's blood was
64. See I THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 24, at 44; Baldassi, supra note 24, at 3.
65. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 446 (14th ed.
1803).
66. See id. at 444. "A [child born out of wedlock] wasfilius nullius, the child of no one, and
could inherit from neither father nor mother." JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS,
TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 110 (9th ed. 2013).
67. See Mason ex rel. Chin Suey v. Tillinghast, 26 F.2d 588, 588-89 (1st Cir. 1928); Ng Suey
Hi v. Weedin, 21 F.2d 801, 801-02 (9th Cir. 1927).
68. Glennon, supra note 6, at 562-63; accord James 0. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Proof of
lusband's Impotency or Sterility as Rebutting Presumption of Legitimacy, 84 A.L.R.3d 495 (1978)
(discussing cases where presumptive fathers disputed paternity presumptions).
69. BULLOUGH, supra note 17, at 27.
70. Id
71. LAQUEUR, supra note 21, at 9. Before then, "standard medical-advice books recommend-
ed that to avoid conception women should have intercourse during the middle of their menstrual
cycles, during days twelve through sixteen, now known as the period of maximum fertility." Id.
72. Karl Landsteiner-Biographical, NOBELPRIZE.ORG,
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobeljprizes/medicineiaureates/1930/landsteiner-bio.html (last visited
Mar. 26, 2014).
73. William Edward Taay, Blood Tests to Negative Paternity, 23 MARQ. L. REV. 126, 126
(1939) (citing State v. Wright, 17 N.E.2d 428, 431 (Ohio Ct. App. 1938), rev'd, 20 N.E.2d 229
(Ohio 1939)) (discussing the use of blood-grouping tests).
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group B, the father must have group B in his blood, and thus a father in
group 0 would be excluded.74 Although these blood tests were widely
accepted in paternity cases in Europe in the late 1920s,75 American
courts were much more reluctant to consider them, even after Dr. Land-
steiner won the Nobel Prize in Medicine in 1930 for this work.76 U.S.
courts struggled with three issues regarding the tests in the 1930s and
1940s: (1) whether the science was sufficiently established to admit the
evidence; (2) if the evidence was admitted, how much weight it should
be given; and (3) if a party refused to consent to a blood test, whether the
court had the power to order it. The Supreme Court of South Dakota held
in 1933 that the trial judge's refusal to order the mother and child to
submit to a blood test was not an abuse of discretion because "it insuffi-
ciently appears that the validity of the proposed test meets with such
generally accepted recognition as a scientific fact among medical men as
to say that it constituted an abuse of discretion for a court of justice to
refuse to take cognizance thereof.... Demonstrating how quickly the
court's view of the science was changing, the same court clarified its
decision in 1936, stating:
[I]t is our considered opinion that the reliability of the blood test is
definitively, and indeed unanimously, established as a matter of ex-
pert scientific opinion entertained by authorities in the field, and we
think the time has undoubtedly arrived when the results of such tests,
made by competent persons and properly offered in evidence, should
be deemed admissible in a court of justice whenever paternity is in
issue.
78
Nevertheless, the court found no error in the trial court's refusal to order
blood tests in 1931 because "the literature of the topic of the scientific
reliability of the blood test (at least the body of such literature available
in the English language) is, for the most part, subsequent o that date.,
79
Even after courts ruled the evidence was admissible, and science
agreed that the blood test could definitively exclude someone as a par-
74. See, e.g., Arais v. Kalensnikoff, 74 P.2d 1043, 1045 (Cal. 1937) ("According to the Men-
delian law of inheritance, this blood individuality is an hereditary characteristic which passes from
parent to child, and no agglutinating substance can appear in the blood of a child which is not pre-
sent in the blood of one of its parents. According to the testimony of the physician in this case, the
blood of the child 'contains the agglutinogen B which is not present in the blood of the mother and
therefore must have been present in the blood of the father'; but the blood of the defendant does not
contain this element .... [T]herefore . . . the defendant cannot be the father." (citation omitted));
Commonwealth v. Zammarelli, 17 Pa. D. & C. 229, 230 (1931).
75. In re Swahn's Will, 285 N.Y.S. 234, 236 (Sur. Ct. 1936) (finding credible evidence "that
blood-grouping tests are commonly accepted as admissible evidence on questions of paternity in the
courts of Germany, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Italy, Russia, Poland, Japan, and England" with
"over 5,000 instances... between 1926 and 1929" in continental Europe).
76. Karl Landsteiner-Biographical, supra note 72.
77. State v. Damm (Damm 1), 252 N.W. 7, 12 (S.D. 1933), aff'd, 266 N.W. 667 (S.D. 1936).
78. State v. Damm (Damm 1), 266 N.W. 667, 668 (S.D. 1936).
79. Id. at 671.
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ent,80 triers of fact were not always persuaded by the expert testimony.
The Supreme Court of California upheld a decision that the defendant
was the father despite blood test evidence that excluded him, stating that
the trial court appropriately weighed "the testimony of the mother and
her witnesses on the one hand and the evidence of the defendant, includ-
ing the blood test, on the other."81 One of the most famous cases in-
volved the actor Charlie Chaplin. Despite a stipulation from the mother
and her attorney that the paternity case would be dismissed with preju-
dice should the blood test exclude Chaplin as the father, and a subse-
quent test that did so exclude him, the jury's verdict of paternity was
upheld .
Once courts decided the tests were admissible, a further problem
remained: did courts have the inherent power to order a reluctant party to
submit to the test? An early decision in New York holding that a court
had such power was unanimously reversed,83 prompting the New York
legislature to enact a statute in 1935 to grant such power to a court
"[w]herever it shall be relevant to the prosecution or defense of an ac-
tion. ''84 Similar statutes were enacted in Wisconsin in 1937,85 New Jersey
in 1939,86 and Ohio in 1940.87 In the absence of a specific blood test stat-
ute, some courts found "an inherent power to order [a] physical examina-
tion" without a specific statute.88 A federal court interpreted Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 35, which generally allowed a court to order a physi-
cal examination if the condition is in controversy, to extend to a blood
test.89 The Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity, proposed
in 1952, provided a solution to these questions, but was adopted by very
80. While most of the cases involved paternity, the tests could also be used to determine
maternity. Ludvig Hektoen, Biologic Tests for Medicolegal Purposes, 199 NEW ENG. J. MED. 120,
126 (1928) (two women both claimed to be the mother of a child).
81. Arais v. Kalensnikoff, 74 P.2d 1043, 1047 (Cal. 1937).
82. Berry v. Chaplin, 169 P.2d 442, 449-52 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946).
83. Beuschel v. Manowitz, 271 N.Y.S. 277, 280-82 (Sup. Ct. 1934), rev'd, 272 N.Y.S. 165
(App. Div. 1934).
84. See In re Swahn's Will, 285 N.Y.S. 234, 237-38 (Sur. Ct. 1936) (quoting section 306-a of
the New York Civil Practice Act) (internal quotation mark omitted).
85. WIS STAT. § 325.23 (1937); see also Beach v. Beach, 114 F.2d 479, 480 n.4 (D.C. Cir.
1940) (identifying Wisconsin's statute as an example of a state law authorizing courts to order blood
tests to determine paternity when relevant).
86. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:99-3 to -4 (West 1939); see also Beach, 114 F.2d at 480 n.4 (identify-
ing New Jersey's statute as an example of a state law authorizing courts to order blood tests to de-
termine paternity when relevant).
87. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 12122.1 to .2 (West 1940); see also Beach, 114 F.2d at 480 n.4
(identifying Ohio's statute as an example of a state law authorizing courts to order blood tests to
determine paternity when relevant).
88. See, e.g., Damm 11, 266 N.W. 667, 670 (S.D. 1936) ("Though the cases are not entirely in
accord, it is distinctly the majority view that the courts have an inherent power to order physical
examination even in the absence of statute.").
89. See, e.g., Beach, 114 F.2d at 481 (holding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 35(a), which allows a court
to order a mental or physical examination of a party in an action in which such condition is in con-
troversy, gives a court authority to order a party to submit to a blood test).
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few states in the 1950s and 1960s.90 Section 1 of the Uniform Act em-
powered the court to "order the mother, child[,] and alleged father" to
undergo blood tests in any civil action "in which paternity [wa]s a rele-
vant fact."91 Section 4 declared that, if all the experts concluded that the
alleged father was not the father of the child, "the question of paternity
shall be resolved accordingly.,92 If the blood tests did not exclude the
father, the court exercised its discretion on whether to admit the evidence
because the test was capable of excluding only 50% of the male popula-
tion as a potential parent.
93
III. JUS SANGUINIS FROM 1952 TO THE PRESENT
In 1952, Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), which remains in large part the law today.94 The Act gave the
Secretary of State the responsibility to administer and enforce the law
"relating to . . . the determination of nationality of a person not in the
United States.,95 The INA required a blood relationship to transmit citi-
zenship from a U.S. citizen father to a child born out of wedlock
abroad. 96 At that time, blood tests were admissible in many American
courts to exclude a man as the possible father of the child, but other evi-
dence was needed to establish paternity.97 Nineteen states adopted the
1973 Uniform Parentage Act,98 which provided for blood tests in Section
11 and governed the admissibility of the results in a paternity action in
Section 12. 99 However, it was not until the development of the human
leukocyte antigen (HLA) test in the late 1970s, and then DNA tests, that
the parent could be determined solely by science in the vast majority of
cases. HLA tests, which examined tissue for various antigen markers,
increased the reliability of the results, especially when used in conjunc-
tion with blood tests, to exclude over ninety-one percent of all non-
90. A. Frederick Harris, Some Observations on the Un-Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Deter-
mine Paternity, 9 VILL. L. REV. 59 app. at 76 (1963). Califonia, New Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, Utah, and Michigan initially adopted the 1952 Act. Id. at 59 n.2. California, Louisiana, New
Hampshire, Oregon, and Pennsylvania currently have versions of the Uniform Act. CAL. FAM. CODE
§§ 7550-58 (West 2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:396-:398.2 (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
522:1-:9 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 109.250-264 (West 2013); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5104
(2013).
91. Harris, supra note 90, app. at 76.
92. Id.
93. Kevin L. Petrasic, Note, Cutchember v. Payne: Approaching Perfection in Paternity
Testing, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 227, 231 32 (1984).
94. See U.S. DE'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, 7 FAM §§ 1133.1-.3 (2010).
95. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), ch. 477, § 104, 66 Stat. 163, 174 (current
version at 8 U.S.C. § 1 104(a)(3) (2012)).
96. Id. § 309, 66 Stat. 163, 238.
97. Glennon, supra note 6, at 556.
98. Why States Should Adopt UPA, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Why%20States%2OShould%2OAdopt%2OUPA (last
visited May 15, 2014).
99. Parentage Act Summary, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspxtitle-Parentage%20Act (last visited Mar. 27, 2014).
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fathers.1°° In the late 1980s, DNA tests allowed courts to determine the
probability of paternity at a rate over ninety-nine percent.10 1
Because the birth mother was always the genetic mother until the
advent of in vitro fertilization in 1978,102 determining maternity was
simple. Courts routinely noted that there was no problem establishing
maternity; the difficulty was always paternity.'0 3 For children conceived
without assisted reproduction, American courts and statutes typically
determine paternity by first ascertaining whether the birth mother is mar-
ried; if she is, then her husband is the presumed father.°4 Several states
allow the husband a brief window of time to dispute his paternity before
it becomes conclusive,10 5 while others impose generous or no time limits
on the presumed father's right to rebut.10 6 To preserve family harmony, a
100. Petrasic, supra note 93, at 233-34.
101. Glennon, supra note 6, at 555-56.
102. In vitro fertilization (IVF) involves surgically removing the eggs from a woman and
combining them with the sperm in the lab to form a preembryo; the preembryo is then implanted in a
woman's uterus. In 1978, doctors in the United Kingdom announced the first successful birth of a
child after using IVF. 1978: First 'Test Tube Baby' Born, BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/25/newsid 2499000/2499411.stm (last visited
Mar. 27, 2014).
103. E.g., Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356, 1362 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (Gerber, J.,
concurring) (stating that the issue of maternity "seems to present no great practical problem because
maternal identity always seems to be a given fact"); Lohman v. Camahan, 963 So. 2d 985, 988 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2007) ("For centuries, the law developed on the assumption that a mother's parentage
was certain, but a father's connection to a child could be open to doubt."). But see Charles P. Kin-
dregan, Jr., Considering Mon: Maternity and the Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Tech-
nology, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 601, 603-04 (2009) (recognizing that assisted repro-
ductive technology may complicate maternity determinations).
104. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-814 (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-20 (2013); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 584-4 (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2208 (2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-204
(West 2013). This marital presumption may apply to a same-sex married couple in a state that rec-
ognizes such marriages. In Della Corte v. Ramirez, the court held that because Della Corte (the birth
mother) and Ramirez were married when the child was born and Ramirez had consented to the
procedure, Ramirez was the child's legal parent pursuant to a Massachusetts law stating that "[a]ny
child born to a married woman as a result of artificial insemination with the consent of her husband,
shall be considered the legitimate child of the mother and such husband." 961 N.E.2d 601, 602-03
(Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (emphasis omitted) (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46, § 4B (2012)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court wrote, "We do not read 'husband' to exclude same-sex married
couples, but determine that same-sex married partners are similarly situated to heterosexual couples
in these circumstances." Della Corte, 961 N.E.2d at 603.
105. In California and Delaware, for example, the husband has two years to challenge the
presumption of paternity. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541 (West 2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-607
(2013); In re Paulson, No. CS99-03153, 2006 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 281, at *30-31 (Del. Fam. Ct.
Sept. 15, 2006) (referencing Delaware's presumed paternity statute). In Louisiana, the husband has
one year from the day he "learns or should have learned of the birth of the child," unless the husband
and wife lived separate and apart for the 300 days preceding the birth. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 189
(2013). Similarly, the District of Columbia provides two years to rebut the presumption unless the
presumed father did not live with the mother for the 300 days preceding the birth and did not openly
hold out the child as his own. D.C. CODE § 16-2342 (2012),
106. E.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-607(a) (2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-814 (2013); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 19-4-105 (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-20 (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. § 584-4 (2013);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2209 (2013) (a child or a person on behalf of the child can bring an action
any time if the relationship is presumed, but if not, a child or a person on behalf of the child can
bring an action "at any time until three years after the child reaches the age of majority"); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1562 (2013); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1027 (West 2013); UTAH
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man who believes he is the genetic father but is not married to the mother
has no standing to assert his parenthood in many states.'°7 Thus, in some
cases genetics is trumped by the marital presumption for paternity.
If the birth mother is not married, genetics play a wider role in de-
termining paternity, although they still might not be conclusive. In a typ-
ical statute, the genetic father can claim paternity by participating in the
child's life.'0 8 DNA alone is not enough; the man must act as the child's
parent in some way.10 9 As the United States Supreme Court observed in
Lehr v. Robertson10 :
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the
natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop
a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and ac-
cepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future, he may
enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make unique-
ly valuable contributions to the child's development. If he fails to do
so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a state to
listen to his opinion of where the child's best interests lie. I
In 1978, when the first child was born using in vitro fertilization,
maternity became an issue as well. Now that doctors were removing a
CODE ANN. § 78B-15-607 (West 2013) (presumption for child of marriage may be rebutted at any
time prior to filing action for divorce or in pleadings for divorce).
107. E.g., P.G. v. G.H., 857 So. 2d 823, 825, 830 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (holding that despite
DNA test establishing ninety-nine percent probability that G.H., not the birth mother's husband, was
the child's father, G.H. lacked standing to assert paternity as long as birth mother's husband main-
tained that he was father of her child); Rodney F. v. Karen M., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 402-03 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1998) (holding that Karen M.'s husband, not Rodney F., was the "presumed father" of the
child born to Karen M., a married woman, and thus Robert F. had no standing to sue for paternity);
J.S. v. S.M.M., 67 So. 3d 1231, 1233 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (S.M.M. could not challenge patermi-
ty of husband when child born to wife of intact marriage); Barnes v. Jeudevine, 718 N.W.2d 311,
315 16 (Mich. 2006) (affidavit of parentage and birth certificate naming former boyfriend as child's
father did not rebut presumption that birth mother's husband was father; boyfriend had no standing
to assert paternity); Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of
Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B. U. L. REv. 227, 236 n.37 (2006) (identifying a few
states that allow a man to challenge a husband's status as father, but noting that, "[n]onetheless,
procedural doctrines of finality, such as issue preclusion and collateral estoppel, prevent genetics-
based challenges to adjudicated determinations of the husband's presumed paternity").
108. E.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a) (1973) ("A man is presumed to the natural father of a
child if: ... (4) while the child is under the age of majority, he receives the child into his home and
openly holds out the child as his natural child ...."); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a) (2002) ("A
man is presumed to be the father of a child if: . . . (5) for the first two years of the child's life, he
resided in the same household with the child and openly held out the child as his own.").
109. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389, 392 (1979) (holding that a state statute that
allowed unwed mothers, but not unwed fathers, a veto over the adoption of the couple's children
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, but noting, however, that "[i]n those
cases where the father never has come forward to participate in the rearing of his child, nothing in
the Equal Protection Clause precludes the State from withholding from him the privilege of vetoing
the adoption of that child"); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254 n.14, 255-56 (1978) (holding
that adoption of a child did not violate the genetic father's due process and equal protection rights
because, for eleven years between the child's birth and the adoption petition, the man had not legiti-
mized the child and did not have custody).
110. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
Ill. Id. at 262 (footnote omitted).
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woman's eggs and fertilizing them in the lab, the woman who gave birth
might not be the genetic mother: She could be using eggs donated from
another woman, or she could be a gestational carrier. Rather than assume
that the woman who gave birth was the mother, the State Department
required the woman to have a blood relationship to the child as well,
even if she was married to the child's genetic father.1 12 "The laws on
acquisition of U.S. citizenship through a parent have always contemplat-
ed the existence of a blood relation between the child and the parent(s)
through whom citizenship is claimed,"' 13 the Department of State For-
eign Affairs Manual asserts. Thus, even if the child is born in wedlock
and presumed to be the issue of that marriage, "This presumption [of
parentage] is not determinative in citizenship cases ... because an actual
blood relationship to a U.S. citizen parent is required."'1 14 The Ninth Cir-
cuit has rejected the State Department's interpretation in two cases that
did not involve ART, holding that a child was entitled to U.S. citizenship
even though the child lacked a genetic tie to the U.S.-citizen parent .
15
Others have criticized the State Department's interpretation of the Act,
arguing that it goes beyond the language of the statute.
116
In late 2013, the State Department quietly amended its website to
recognize giving birth as a means to prove maternity.17 With this
change, the State Department reflected language in recent U.S. Supreme
Court cases that assumes that the woman who gives birth is also the ge-
netic mother of the child.' 18 Justice Stevens's opinion in Miller v. Al-
bright"9 in 1998, for example, is based solidly on that assumption. In
noting the requirements for a single woman to convey her U.S. citizen-
ship to her child born abroad, the court stated that "she must first choose
to carry the pregnancy to term and reject the alternative of abortion ....
112. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, 7 FAM § 1131.4-1.a (2010).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Solis-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a child
was born in wedlock and was not deportable, even though the child had no genetic tie to a U.S.
citizen, because the birth mother gave up the child to the genetic father and his U.S. citizen wife);
Scales v. INS, 232 F.3d 1159, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a child was born in wedlock
and was thus a "legitimate child" under the INA because, at the time of the child's birth, the Philip-
pine mother was married to a U.S. citizen, even though the child was conceived prior to the marriage
by a non-U.S. father).
116. E.g., Titshaw, supra note 5, at 105; Bernard Friedland & Valerie Epps, The Changing
Family and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Impact of Medical Reproductive Technology on the
Immigration and Nationality Act's Definition of the Family, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 429, 451 (1997)
(arguing, for example, that in cases where donor eggs are fertilized with the husband's sperm and
then implanted into the wife, "[t]here seems to be no reason not to treat the wife as the mother of the
child for immigration purposes, where it is clear that the egg donor waived any rights in possible
offspring").
117. "[A] U.S. citizen mother must be either the genetic or the gestational and legal mother of
the child at the time and place of the child's birth." U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 5.
118. See, e.g., Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 433-34 (1998); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53,
61 (2001).
119. 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
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She must then actually give birth to the child." 120 By so doing, "[t]he
blood relationship to the birth mother is immediately obvious and is typi-
cally established by hospital records and birth certificates" thus differen-
tiating her conduct from that of the unwed father, who may not even be
aware of the birth.12 1 Writing for the majority in a more recent citizen-
ship case, Justice Kennedy likewise assumed that the birth mother is al-
ways genetically related to her child. He declared that "[first, a citizen
mother expecting a child and living abroad has the right to reenter the
United States so the child can be born here and be a [Fourteenth]
Amendment citizen., 122 That option would not be available if a foreign
gestational carrier gives birth to the child. Echoing Justice Stevens in
Miller, Justice Kennedy asserted that "[i]n the case of the mother, the
[biological parent-child] relation is verifiable from the birth itself."123 If
that were true, however, all three of the women in our case studies,
American citizens who gave birth in Switzerland, Israel and India, would
have transmitted their U.S. citizenship to their children had the language
now used on the website been followed.
124
IV. DETERMINING PARENTAGE FOR A CHILD CONCEIVED USING ART
How should we determine parentage, and in particular maternity,
now that genetics and gestation can be separated through assisted repro-
duction technology (ART)? For centuries, we had only one test for ma-
ternity: the mother was (and still is, in most cases) the woman who gave
birth, the parturient. Many countries have adopted the parturient rule,
including Argentina, Austria, Chile, France, Germany, Japan, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and the U.K.'25 The rule is justified
because:
[I]t is predictable, pragmatic and not dependent on further analysis,
such as a genetic test; it thus promotes legal certainty. Second, the
woman carrying the child is the person who, during pregnancy and at
birth, establishes a strong physical and psychological bond with the
child ....
This can also be [a] coherent choice for legal systems where surro-
gate motherhood, while not prohibited, is discouraged or strongly
regulated. If a surrogacy agreement is entered into nonetheless, with-
out complying with the prescribed rules, the consequence again
120. Miller, 523 U.S. at 433.
121. Id. at 436, 438.
122. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 61 (2001).
123. Id. at 62.
124. The State Department website now recognizes the "genetic or the gestationa"' mother to
transmit her citizenship to the child. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 5 (emphasis added).
125. Daniel Gruenbaum, Foreign Surrogate Motherhood: Mater Semper Certa Erat, 60 AM. J.
COMP. L. 475, 476-77 (2012).
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would be that the parturient, not the commissioning woman, should
be considered the legal mother. 
126
As a New Jersey Court observed in denying a pre-birth order that
would have declared that the genetic parents, not the gestational carrier,
were the parents of the child:
A bond is created between a gestational mother and the baby she
carries in her womb for nine months. During the pregnancy, the fetus
relies on the gestational mother for a myriad of contributions. A ges-
tational mother's endocrine system determines the timing, amount
and components of hormones that affect the fetus. The absence of
any component at its appropriate time will irreversibly alter the life,
mental capacity, appearance, susceptibility to disease and structure
of the fetus forever. The gestational mother contributes an endo-
crine cascade that determines how the child will grow, when its cells
will divide and differentiate in the womb, and how the child will ap-
pear and function for the rest of its life. 127
Susan Appleton favors the parturient rule as a functional test that a
woman can meet "in an objectively ascertainable way." 128 Unlike a ge-
netic test, which would "wreak havoc" with donated gametes and would
require routine genetic testing, or an intent-based test, which requires a
court to ascertain the parents, Appleton's test recognizes that a woman
who gestates a child for nine months has performed parental functions.
29
Jennifer Hendricks also advocates for the parturient rule, emphasizing
that "[a] woman acquires initial parental rights by having biological off-
spring whom she gestates and to whom she gives birth; a man acquires
similar rights by caring for his offspring after they are born."'3 Like
Appleton, she notes that the test also allows maternity to be determined
without involvement by the state.131
The chief consequence of the parturient test is that it excludes those
who want genetic children if neither partner can gestate a child, because
the gestational carrier is deemed the mother.'32 For states that seek to ban
126. Id. at 477-79 (footnote omitted).
127. A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 953-54 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
128. Appleton, supra note 107, at 283.
129. Id. at 283-84.
130. Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429, 444
(2007) (footnote omitted).
131. Id. at 466.
132. Susan Appleton has pointed out a possible solution that some scholars have advocated:
apply the parturient rule only in cases of coital reproduction and donor insemination, but not when a
gestational carrier is used. Appleton, supra note 107, at 264-66. Ultimately, she rejected this varia-
tion:
Try as I might, I cannot escape the conclusion that, in applying a functional test to con-
struct a default rule operative at the time of birth, the woman gestating the pregnancy-
the "surrogate"--will always have met the test, given the unique parental functions she
has performed during pregnancy ....
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or limit gestational carrier arguments, this would be a positive outcome
of the parturient test, even though it would preclude a number of infertile
couples, including all gay couples, from having children with a genetic
tie to one of the intended parents. Several states have attempted to curb
the use of gestational carrier agreements by stating that the gestational
carrier is the legal mother of the resulting child, 33 but an irrefutable pre-
sumption of maternity has been successfully challenged in two states.1
34
The highly publicized "Baby Manji" case illustrates the danger of
the parturient test for a gestational carrier. In 2007, a Japanese couple,
Ikufumi and Yuki Yamada, entered into a gestational carrier agreement
with an Indian woman, Pritiben Mehta.'35 The Yamadas were not alone;
at that time India's commercial surrogacy industry was estimated to
bring in $445 million per year.136 An anonymously donated egg was fer-
tilized with Mr. Yamada's sperm, and the resulting pre-embryo was im-
planted in Ms. Mehta.137 The Yamadas divorced in June 2008, one month
before Baby Manji was born, and only Mr. Yamada sought parentage of
the child. 38 The Japanese Embassy in India refused to give the child a
passport or visa because Japanese law does not recognize surrogate chil-
dren. 39 India would not issue a birth certificate because Indian law re-
quires both the mother and the father to be named, and authorities were
unsure whether the gestational carrier, the egg donor, or the intended
mother was the mother of the child, especially since none of the three
sought to be declared the mother.140 With no birth certificate, India re-
fused to issue a passport, and so Baby Manji was stateless. Mr. Yamada
did not have the option to adopt his own genetic child; an 1890 law pro-
hibits single men from adopting baby girls."4 Following argument in the
India Supreme Court, the Indian government agreed to issue an identity
Id. at 275. The new Uniform Probate Code (UPC) amendments (2008) for children of assisted repro-
duction have adopted this solution. UPC § 2-120 declares that the woman who gives birth is the
mother if she is not a gestational carrier; another section, UPC § 2-121, applies when a gestational
carrier is used to declare that the woman who gives birth is ordinarily not considered the mother of
the child. Kristine S. Knaplund, The New Uniform Probate Code's Surprising Gender Inequities, 18
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 335, 341 & nn.46-48 (2011).
133. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 25-218, invalidated by Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (repealed 2005).
134. Soos, 897 P.2d at 1360-61; J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1283 (D. Utah 2002).
135. Kari Points, Commercial Surrogacy and Fertility Tourism in India: The Case of Baby
Manji, KENAN INST. FOR ETHICS DUKE U. 2 (2009), available at
https://web.duke.edu/kenanethics/CaseStudies/BabyManji.pdf.
136. Id. at 3.
137. Id. at 2.
138. Japan Gate-Pass for Baby Manji, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 18, 2008),
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1081018/j sp/nation/story_9984517.jsp.
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certificate for Baby Manji, after which the Japanese mbassy issued her a
one-year visa to travel to Japan.a2
Some argue that the parturient test shortchanges the harm suffered
by the intended parents while emphasizing the loss felt by the gestational
carrier;43 it assumes that the bond felt by the parturient is superior to
those developed by parents who lack a genetic or adoptive tie to the
child, an assumption that is not supported by existing studies.'44 It also
allows a gestational carrier who has agreed to relinquish the child at birth
to renege on her promise.1 45 The test places great emphasis on the bond
formed during pregnancy, arguably making it superior to parental bonds
formed later. Part of this bond may be chemical. Many pregnant women
experience an increase in the hormone oxytocin (OT), which is believed
to encourage postpartum behaviors (such as nursing) and to "prime[] the
mental processes required for affiliative bonds."'146 "[M]aternal bonding
to the fetus during the third trimester was predicted by the increase in
plasma OT from the 1 st to the 3rd trimester, indicating dynamic associa-
tions between OT and the evolving maternal-infant bond.'' 147 But not all
pregnant women have high levels of OT; those with low levels are asso-
ciated with symptoms of depression both before and after the birth.
148
High OT levels are also found in foster parents149 and women playing
with children not their own. 150 A number of studies have found that
adoptive parents and their children have strong relationships.51 Thus, the
142. Finally, Baby Manji Flies to Papa in Japan Today, TIMES INDIA (Oct. 31, 2008, 17:56
IST), http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2008-10-31/jaipur/27907561 _ japanese-surrogate-
baby-manji-yamada-surrogate-child.
143. See, e.g., John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a "Parent"? The Claims of
Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 407 (1991); Marjorie Maguire
Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neu-
trality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 366 (1990).
144. See Hill, supra note 143, at 399-400.
145. Id. at 393; John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal
Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 1014-15 (1986); Shultz, supra note 143,
at 384.
146. Ruth Feldman et al., Evidence for a Neuroendocrinological Foundation of Human Affilia-
tion: Plasma Oxytocin Levels Across Pregnancy and the Postpartum Period Predict Mother-Infant
Bonding, 18 PSYCHOL. Sci. 965, 969 (2007). See also Wendy Saltzman & Dario Maestripieri, The
Neuroendocrinology of Primate Maternal Behavior, 35 PROGRESS NEURO-PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY
& BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 1192, 1197 (2011) (noting the correlation of OT and attachment to
fetus, such that OT may act to facilitate the onset of maternal behavior).
147. Ruth Feldman, Oxytocin and Social Affiliation in Humans, 61 HORMONES & BEHAV. 380,
384 (2012).
148. Id. at 386; see also Feldman et al., supra note 146, at 969.
149. Feldman et al., supra note 146, at 386.
150. Johanna Bick & Mary Dozier, Mothers' Concentrations of Oxytocin Following Close,
Physical Interactions with Biological and Nonbiological Children, 52 DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOBIOLOGY 100, 104 (2010) ("Mothers showed higher levels of oxytocin following interac-
tions with unfamiliar children than following interactions with their own children.").
151. Hill, supra note 143, at 402-03 & n.255; Steven L. Nickman et al., Children in Adoptive
Families: Overview and Update, 44 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 987, 989
(2005) (stating that in a study of 715 adoptive families in the United States, ninety-five percent of
the adoptive parents endorsed the statement "I feel deeply attached to my child" (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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parturient test may assume a strong bond where none in fact exists, and
discount the bonds formed between parents and children after the child's
birth.
In the three cases cited above,'52 in which American women used
donated ova to give birth to a child in Switzerland, Israel or India, a par-
turient test would provide the most equitable result. All three women
used donated eggs to become pregnant and give birth to children that
they intended to raise. In the United States, each of the three women
would be the presumed mother because she gave birth to the child.'53 No
one is likely to challenge her status as the mother if the egg donor is truly
a donor, 54 although many states have yet to enact statutes eliminating
parental status for an egg donor.55 Thus, for our three present cases, the
matter could be easily resolved by changing the State Department regula-
tions to mirror existing state law and the language on the State Depart-
ment's website. However, because a parturient test would exclude infer-
tile couples from being presumed parents in many cases, other parentage
tests should also be considered.
Now that the science has progressed to the point that we can posi-
tively identify a child's genetic parents with a very high degree of cer-
tainty,156 should that be our test for parentage? Anthony Miller is a key
proponent of the view that genetics should be one of the tests for parent-
age, arguing that the biological connection is unique and worthy of con-
stitutional protection.57 Indeed, he asserts that presumptions (such as the
marital presumption) that prevent a genetic father from proving paternity
may violate a man's substantive and procedural due process rights.158 A
genetic test would always exclude at least half of a same-sex couple from
claiming parentage; it would also insert a third (or even fourth) party into
152. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
153. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(a)(1) (2002); Malina Coleman, Gestation, Intent, and the
Seed: Defining Motherhood in the Era of Assisted Human Reproduction, 17 CARDOzO L. REV. 497,
524 (1996).
154. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 675, 678, 682 (Cal. 2005) (concluding the woman
who donated an egg to her same-sex partner and the woman who gives birth to the child are both
parents).
155. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 2012); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/3(b) (2013); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 23-2208(f) (West 2013); MINN. STAT. § 257.56(2) (2013); MO. REV. STAT. §
210.824(2) (2013); MONT, CODE ANN. § 40-6-106(2) (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.061(2)
(West 2011); WISC. STAT. § 891.40(2) (2013), for examples of statutes that state that a sperm donor
is not a parent but do not explicitly include an egg donor.
156. See, e.g., E. Donald Shapiro, Stewart Reifler & Claudia L. Psome, The DNA Paternity
Test: Legislating the Future Paternity Action, 7 JL. & HEALTH 1, 29-30 (1992-93) (stating that
current tests determine probability of parentage to 99.999999% accuracy); cf State ex rel. Dep't of
Soc. Servs. v. Miller, 218 S.W.3d 2, 3-4 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that blood tests showed that
twin brothers each had a 99.999% probability of being the father).
157. Anthony Miller, Baseline, Bright-Line, Best Interests: A Pragmatic Approach for Califor-
nia to Provide Certainty in Determining Parentage, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 637, 694-97 (2003).
158. Anthony Miller, The Case for the Genetic Parent: Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, Lehr, and
Michael H. Revisited, 53 LoY. L. REV. 395, 437, 440-41 (2007).
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any couple-heterosexual or homosexual-using donated gametes.
59
The main allure of the test-its certainty-may prove to be ephemeral as
science progresses. Even today, a DNA test is unable to discern parent-
age in cases of identical twins.' 60 Two recent cases, neither involving
assisted reproduction, struggled with the issue of paternity when the po-
tential father was an identical twin. Because DNA tests established both
men as the father, other evidence-the old nineteenth century, eighteenth
century, even seventeenth century tests of access to the mother-was
needed to determine which twin had fathered the child.
In the future, scientific advances in assisted reproduction technolo-
gy may open the door to children with mixed DNA, thus rendering the
DNA tests inconclusive in more instances. In the early 1990s, researchers
reported a controversial and highly successful ART that created genetic
anomalies in the children. Dr. Jacques Cohen pioneered a solution for
female infertility in which the ooplasm (cytoplasm) of a donor egg was
injected into the egg of a woman who had had difficulty conceiving.'
61
The initial attempts resulted in twelve clinical pregnancies after twenty-
eight attempts in twenty-five women, a rate "higher than expected" in a
population in which participants had had difficulty conceiving.'62 Over
the next several years, as many as thirty children were born using this
technique.63 After confirmation that some of the children had genetic
material from three sources (the donor egg, the intended mother's egg,
and the sperm),164 the Food and Drug Administration notified Dr. Cohen
and his team that the use of techniques such as ooplasm transfer "consti-
tutes a clinical investigation and requires submission of an Investigation-
159. See, e.g., Dantzigv. Biron, No. 07CA 1, 2008 WL 187532, at* 1-3 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 18,
2008) (dismissing action brought by genetic father who sued gestational carrier for paternity for
failure to join the natural mother, the egg donor, as a party).
160. See Dep't of Pub. Aid ex rel. Masinelli v. Whitworth, 652 N.E.2d 458, 459-60 (111. App.
Ct. 1995) (deciding blood tests showed that either twin brother could be father of child despite
testimony by mother of child that she had sexual relations with one brother but not the other); Miller,
218 S.W.3d at 3-4, 6 (finding that blood tests showed that twin brothers each had a 99.999% proba-
bility of being the father; because mother testified to having had sexual relations with both brothers,
the court used other evidence to determine which brother had access to mother at time of concep-
tion). Because the children in these cases were conceived coitally, evidence other than genetic tests
could be used to determine paternity.
161. Jacques Cohen et al., Ooplasmic Transfer in Mature Human Oocytes, 4 MOLECULAR
HUM. REPROD. 269, 277 (1998).
162. Jason A. Barritt et al., Mitrochondria in Human Offspring Derived from Ooplasmic
Transplantation, 16 HUM. REPROD. 513, 513 (2001).
163. David Whitehouse, Genetically Altered Babies Born, BBC NEWS (May 4, 2001, 15:26
GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/sci/tech/1312708.stm.
164. Barritt, supra note 162, at 513; Heidi Mertes & Guido Pennings, Embryonic Stem Cell-
Derived Gametes and Genetic Parenthood: A Problematic Relationship, 17 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 7, 8 (2008) ("[Olne objection persists against both ooplasmic transfer and
oocyte nuclear transfer, namely, that the resulting child would have two genetic mothers: one provid-




al New Drug application (IND) to FDA,' 165 shutting down the experi-
ment in the United States.'66 Doctors developing a related procedure to
overcome infertility, in which the nucleus from one woman's egg was
injected into a donor egg, halted their research after the FDA letter and
gave their results to doctors in China.'67 Most recently, scientists have
replaced mutated mitochondrial DNA with donor DNA, reporting that
70% of the experimental eggs were successfully fertilized.168 A recent
article in The Economist describing Dr. Shoukhrat Mitalipov's work at
the Oregon Health and Science University featured a cover banner that
proclaimed "The benefits of having three parents." ' 169 Even without hu-
man intervention to alter DNA, there is evidence that mitochondrial het-
eroplasmy, in which mitochondrial DNA inherited from the mother is not
identical in all samples from a single person, can occur spontaneously.
170
Although DNA tests today sequence nuclear DNA and not mitochondrial
DNA, we can't assume that this will always be the case as science pro-
gresses.
In the future, the use of inheritable genetic modifications (IGM)
could alter DNA such that the child's DNA would not reflect the genetic
makeup of her parents. Scientists are experimenting with ways to alter a
specific gene through in vitro fertilization, gene transfer, stem cells, and
165. Letter from Kathryn C. Zoon, Dir., Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation & Research, Food &
Drug Admin., to Sponsors / Researchers, Dep't of Health and Human Servs. et al. (July 6, 2001),
available at http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/SafetyAvailability/ucml 05852.htm.
166. The risks associated with mixing the mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) are not known, but
there is speculation that the donor might transmit a hereditary disease or alter certain behavioral
traits. Mertes & Pennings, supra note 164, at 8; see also Rachel Levy et al., Cytoplasmic Transfer in
Oocytes: Biochemical Aspects, 10 HUM. REPROD. UPDATE 241, 245 (2004) (noting that mtDNA is
transmitted only by the female for an evolutionary reason, and so including mtDNA from a second
female might have unexpected effects); M. De Rycke et al., Epigenetic Risks Related to Assisted
Reproductive Technologies, 17 HUM. REPROD. 2487, 2491 (2002) ("Ooplasmic transfer into human
oocytes may induce conflicts between the multiple genome parts (nuclear DNA, recipient mtDNA,
donor mtDNA) and lead to unpredictable outcomes."); E. Scott Sills et al., Genetic and Epigenetic
Modifications Associated with Human Ooplasm Donation and Mitochondrial Heteroplasmy-
Considerations for Interpreting Studies of Heritability and Reproductive Outcome, 62 MED.
HYPOTHESES 612, 615 (2004) (observing that negative outcomes may not be known for several
decades). Note that the nuclear DNA is not affected by ooplasmic transfer. See A.L. Bredenoord et
al., Ooplasmic and Nuclear Transfer to Prevent Mitochondrial DNA Disorders: Conceptual and
Normative Issues, 14 HUM. REPROD. UPDATE 669, 670 (2008).
167. See Denise Grady, Pregnancy Created Using Egg Nucleus of Infertile Woman, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 2003, at Al.
168. Gautam Naik, DNA Switch Boosts Disease Fight, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2012, at A4.
169. Hello Mothers, Hello Father, ECONOMIST, Oct. 27, 2012, at 79, 79-80, cover.
170. See Mark R. Wilson et al., A Family Exhibiting Heteroplasmy in the Human Mitochondri-
al DNA Control Region Reveals Both Somatic Mosaicism and Pronounced Segregation of Mitotypes,
100 HuM. GENETICS 167, 167, 170 (1997), for an analysis of mitochondrial DNA typing of three
separate hair oot extracts from a single individual. The study concluded that "the degree of hetero-
plasmy differs from hair to hair." Id. at 169. Accordingly, the authors advised that "[d]epending on
the situation, if there is an apparent difference of one or two nucleotides between two samples, one
should consider the possibility of heteroplasmy.... Should evidence exist for a heteroplasmic mix-
ture at such a base or bases, the proper interpretation would be a failure to exclude" the two samples
as potentially originating from the same source. Id. at 170.
2014]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
cloning.'71 Currently, prospective parents using in vitro fertilization can
analyze each pre-embryo for specific genetic diseases, such as Tay Sachs
or cystic fibrosis, to choose which to implant if at least one viable pre-
embryo is free of the disease. No genes are modified or altered through
this procedure, called pre-implantation genetic diagnosis or screening.
172
By contrast, IGM would change the genetic makeup by removing em-
bryonic stem cells from the pre-embryo, altering the cells to create new
genes, and eventually implanting the pre-embryo with the modified cells
in a woman.173 The resulting child would have a gene that is absent from
both her mother and her father. In the distant future, science may make it
possible for prospective parents to assemble a child through synthetically
created genes, so theoretically the child's entire genetic makeup might be
different from the parents'. Now that J. Craig Venter and his team have
assembled a synthetic genome of a simple bacterium that has replicated
itself, 74 the possibility of a human genome constructed entirely from
synthetic materials, although far in the future, means that a genetic test
would be ineffective: such a child could have DNA constructed from a
parent's wish list which did not match any living person's DNA. 75 Thus,
the main appeal of the genetic test-its certainty-already fails in a vari-
ety of cases today and is likely to fail in even more cases as the science
progresses.
The use of ART-including in vitro fertilization, donated sperm and
ova, gestational carriers, and other techniques-has led to a third test:
intended parentage. The parent of the child, proponents argue, should be
the one who sets the process in motion with the ultimate goal of parent-
ing the child, even if that parent has no genetic connection to the child
and did not give birth.176 The "intended parent" test has long been ap-
plied to establish paternity: a man who consented to his wife's use of
assisted insemination with donor sperm was considered the father, de-
spite his lack of a genetic tie. Can the intended parent test be used to es-
tablish maternity as well? Scholars have noted the arbitrariness of favor-
ing a gestational carrier over the genetic mother through the parturient
171. Inheritable Genetic Modification Basic Science, CENTER FOR GENETICS & SOC'Y,
http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/article.php?id=286 (last modified June 1, 2006).
172. Jaime King, Predicting Probability: Regulating the Future of Preimplantation Genetic
Screening, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 283, 285 (2008).
173. Inheritable Genetic Modification Basic Science, supra note 171.
174. Craig Venter, Watch Me Unveil "Synthetic Life", TED: IDEAS WORTH SPREADING (May
2010), http://www.ted.com/talks/craigventer unveils syntheticlife.html.
175. See generally Kristine S. Knaplund, Synthetic Cells, Synthetic Life, and Inheritance, 45
VAL. U. L. REV. 1361, 1362 (2011) (examining "the practical and regulatory issues that may encour-
age or inhibit the use of Venter's technology to create synthetic gametes and the legal issues of
parentage and inheritance for a synthetically created child").
176. See, e.g., Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and
the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 602 (2002) ("[T]he law should un-
derstand intentional parenthood as subsumed by the notion of functional parenthood .... ).
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test.177 A woman who agreed to carry the child for another person, prom-
ising to relinquish the baby on birth, should not be permitted to override
her earlier promise; after all, she never would have received the embryo
at all but for the earlier agreement.178 Some see the use of either the ge-
netic or the parturient test as trying to wedge all couples into pre-existing
categories, with the paradigm being a married, heterosexual couple, even
though many using ART do not fit this model. 1
79
Rather than enacting one definition of maternity (such as "the
mother is the woman who gives birth"), a wiser course is to enact differ-
ent presumptions of maternity, similar to those enacted for paternity. For
example, states no longer have a conclusive presumption that the birth
mother's husband is the father; rather, the husband is a presumed father,
but others can avail themselves of the presumption as well.180 If a hus-
band and wife use in vitro fertilization to create a pre-embryo using their
genetic material and then hire a gestational carrier who gives birth to the
child, the gestational carrier can use the presumption of maternity be-
cause she gave birth, while the wife can use a presumption of maternity
based on a DNA test.'18 For an intended parent who has no genetic tie to
the child, a third presumption is needed, which could be based on the
intent of the person to parent the child.
82
177. Hill, supra note 143, at 399-400 (arguing that no evidence exists to show that a biological
or birthing -bond is superior to the bonds formed by parents of children with no biological relation,
such as by adoption); Shultz, supra note 143, at 331-33 (asserting that there is no persuasive basis
for preferring the birth mother over the genetic mother).
178. Robertson, supra note 145, at 1015; Shultz, supra note 143, at 366-67.
179. Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Func-
tional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 598-99 (2002) ("[R]estrictive policies ...
promise to widen the divide between the myriad forms of the family that exist in society today and
the ability of the law to protect the integrity of those families."); see Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining
or Biology? The History and Future of Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 1, 62 (2004) (arguing that an intent-based test eliminates the distinction between heterosexual
and homosexual couples, as well as distinctions between children conceived coitally and those
conceived with ART); Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting Children(?): Marriage, Gender, and Assisted
Reproductive Technology, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177, 1180 (2010) (arguing that heterosexual imita-
tion is unjust because a same-sex couple's child will have only one legal parent, resulting in finan-
cial and other deprivations for the child); Kelly M. O'Bryan, Comment, Mommy or Daddy and Me:
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DEPAUL L. REV. 1115, 1143 (2011) ("[N]o [legitimate] reason exists to provide the children born to
lesbian parents through the use of reproductive technology with less security and protection than that
given to children born to heterosexual parents through artificial insemination." (second alteration in
original) (quoting In re A.B., 818 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), vacated sub nom. King v.
S.B., 837 N.E.2d 965 (Ind. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted)),
180. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a) (1973) ("A man is presumed to be the natural
father of a child if:... (4) while the child is under the age of majority, he receives the child into his
home and openly holds out the child as his natural child .... "); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)
(2002) ("A man is presumed to be the father of a child if:... (5) for the first two years of the child's
life, he resided in the same household with the child and openly held out the child as his own.").
181. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781-82 (Cal. 1993) (in bank) (holding that the
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182. Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005).
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If we enact several presumptions of maternity, we face the difficult
problem of deciding which presumptive mother prevails. In a gestational
carrier case, in which the woman who gives birth is not genetically relat-
ed to the child, who "wins" will depend on the court's view of the en-
forceability of the contract: if the agreement is enforceable, the intended
mother, not the birth mother, will prevail; 83 if the agreement is not en-
forceable, the gestational carrier will be the mother.' 84
But how do we resolve switched embryo cases? These are cases in
which the woman who gives birth intended to carry her own child, but
through a series of events (usually a mistake by the clinic, but it could
also occur by design), she is implanted with the wrong embryo. 85 Thus,
the birth mother is not a true gestational carrier, but she is also not the
genetic mother of the child she bears. Who should prevail? In a 2000
case in New York, for example, the Perry-Rogers' embryo was implant-
ed in Ms. Fasano, along with Ms. Fasano's own embryo; Ms. Fasano
subsequently gave birth to two children, one her own genetic child and
the other the genetic child of Perry-Rogers.1 86 The court acknowledged
that a bond could develop with the gestational mother but held that "the
suggested existence of a bond is not enough under the present circum-
stances."'187 Thus, the court sided with the genetic parents (Perry-Rogers)
rather than the parturient (Fasano), in part because Fasano learned of the
mistake before she gave birth.188 A 2003 California case involving mis-
takenly implanted embryos also favored the genetic tie for the father. In
Robert B. v. Susan B.,189 Robert and his wife Denise used an anonymous-
ly donated egg and Robert's sperm to create an embryo that they intend-
ed Denise to carry; however, the embryo was mistakenly implanted in
Susan B., an unmarried woman.190 Rather than deciding that the birth
mother had no rights to the child, as the court held in Perry-Rogers v.
Fasano, this court ruled that, under California law, Susan B. was the
presumed mother because she gave birth; Robert could use the genetic tie
to argue he is the presumed father; and Robert's wife Denise, who lacked
either a gestational or a genetic tie to the child, was not a parent at all.
191
183. See Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 793, 804 (Conn. 2011); De Bemardo v. Gregory,
No. FA074007658S, 2007 WL 4357736, at *3-4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2007); In re Baby Boy
A., No. A07-452, 2007 WL 4304448, at *6-7 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2007); J.F. v. D.B., 879
N.E.2d 740, 741-42 (Ohio 2007); S.N. v. M.B., 935 N.E.2d 463, 470-71 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010).
184. See, e.g., R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 796-97 (Mass. 1998).
185. The State Department warns U.S. couples that "[tlhe Department is aware of cases of
foreign fertility clinics that have substituted alternate donor sperm and eggs when the U.S. parents'
genetic material turned out not to be viable." U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 5.
186. Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19, 21-22 (App. Div. 2000).
187. Id. at 26.
188. Id. at 26-27. Because Perry-Rogers is African American and Fasano is Caucasian, the
decision has been criticized for considering racial bias and sexist factors sub rosa. See Leslie Bend-
er, Genes, Parents, and Assisted Reproductive Technologies: ARTs, Mistakes, Sex, Race, & Law, 12
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 32 (2003).
189. 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 (Ct. App. 2003).
190. Id. at 786-87.
191. Id at 789-90.
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Genetics may not control if enough time elapses before the genetic par-
ents seek to claim the child. An attempt by the genetic parents for visita-
tion was denied when the trial court found that it was not in the best in-
terests of the children, who were almost fourteen years old. 1
92
The overseas mix-ups described in the State Department warning
present a more difficult ethical problem. In both Perry-Rogers v. Fasano
and Robert B. v. Susan B., the genetic parents of the mistakenly implant-
ed embryo could be identified and wanted to claim "their"
genetic child. In some cases, however, the implanted embryo may have
been created by anonymously donated gametes. The birth mother be-
lieves she is carrying her own genetic child but learns otherwise when
the State Department requires a blood test. Even if the genetic parents of
the child can be found, it is not at all certain that they would want to
claim the child as their own. Will this child then be an orphan? If the
birth mother is a U.S. citizen, she may be able to transmit citizenship to
the child if she meets the residency requirements. If the couple were try-
ing to claim citizenship through the father, however, citizenship would
be denied when the blood reveals no tie.
In denying a person's petition to be declared a parent, a court may
suggest adoption as an alternative.'93 In Andres A. v. Judith N.,' 94 for
example, a married couple, Luz and Andres, used their gametes to form a
pre-embryo, which was implanted in a gestational carrier, Judith* *95 After
Judith gave birth to twins, Luz, Andres, Judith, and Judith's husband
David sought a declaration that the genetic and intended parents, Luz and
Andres, were the children's legal parents.196 Under New York law, An-
dres, as the genetic father, could challenge the presumption that the birth
mother's husband was the father of the children, but the court was pow-
erless to make a declaration of maternity, and so Judith, the birth mother,
remained as the second parent.197 "The court note[d] that petitioner Luz
A. [was] not without a remedy since she [could seek] to adopt the two
children."198 That would have entailed considerable expense and time,'99
as a Massachusetts court observed in another case seeking an uncontest-
ed pre-birth order.200 Requiring the genetic parents to adopt the children
192. Prato-Morrison v. Doe, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509, 515-16 (Ct. App. 2002) ("Simply put, the
social relationship established by the Does and their daughters is more important to the children than
a genetic relationship with a stranger.").
193. See, e.g., In re T.J.S., 16 A.3d 386, 388-89, 398 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (finding
that, in the case of a child born to gestational carrier with sperm of husband T.J.S. and donated
ovum, wife A.L.S. was not the legal mother of her husband's biological child and must adopt).
194. 591 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Fam. Ct. 1992).
195. Id. at 947.
196. Id. at 947-48.
197. Id. at 948-50.
198. Id. at 950.
199. Thomas Crampton, What Marriage Means to Gays: All that Law Allows Others, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2004, at BI (citing a cost of about $3,000 for an adoption).
200. Culliton v. Beth Isr. Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1136-38 (Mass. 2001).
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born to a gestational carrier would mean that, during the four-day waiting
period in that state:
[t]he duties and responsibilities of parenthood (for example, support
and custody) would lie with the gestational carrier for at least four
days; the gestational carrier could be free to surrender the children
for adoption; and the genetic parents of the children would be forced
to go through the adoption process, possibly having to wait as long as
six months before becoming the legal parents of the children. As is
evident from its provisions, the adoption statute was not intended to
resolve parentage issues arising from gestational surrogacy agree-
ments.
20'
In the case of a heterosexual married couple like Luz and Andres in
Andres A. or the Cullitons, who sought to adopt their own genetic child
with the consent of the legal parents, the adoption is likely to be success-
ful but still has drawbacks.20 2 The dissenting justices in a 2012 New Jer-
sey case in which the genetic father, his wife, and the gestational carrier
all sought a pre-birth order to include the wife (who had no genetic or
biological connection to the child) listed some of the disadvantages, call-
ing adoption "a considerable burden.., on the intended mother.,20 3 Even
though all involved agreed that the wife should be named the child's
mother, the adoption process would take two to three months, during
which time the child would be "legally motherless.,,2°4 Until the adoption
process was completed, the child would not inherit from the wife if she
died intestate and would have no claim for benefits such as workers'S205
compensation, social security, and life insurance. For a same-sex cou-
ple or a single parent, the process can be much more challenging. Several
states have statutes that prohibit unmarried couples or same-sex couples
from adopting.20 6 In other states, adoption severs the relationship of the
201. Id. at 1138 (citation omitted).
202. Cf Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage
Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201
(2009) (arguing that adoption should not be required for a genetic parent).
203. In re T.J.S., 54 A.3d 263, 276-77 (N.J. 2012) (Albin, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 276.
205. Id. at 277.
206. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (LexisNexis 2013) ("No person... may adopt if that person
is a homosexual."); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (2013) ("Adoption by couples of the same gen-
der is prohibited,"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117(3) (West 2013) ("A child may not be adopted by
a person who is cohabiting in a relationship that is not a legally valid and binding marriage under the
laws of this state."). But see Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Cole, 380 S.W.3d 429, 431-32, 443
(Ark. 201 I) (holding that a law prohibiting unmarried cohabitants from adopting violated the Arkan-
sas Constitution); Fla. Dep't of Children & Families v. X.X.G., 45 So. 3d. 79, 91-92 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2010) (holding that the ban violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Florida Constitution).
See also DAVID M. BRODZINSKY, EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., Adoption by Lesbians and
Gays: A National Survey of Adoption Agency Policies, Practices, and Attitudes, 3, 20 (Oct. 29,
2003), available at http://adoptioninstitute.org/publications/adoption-by-lesbians-and-gays-a-
national-survey-of-adoption-agency-policies-practices-and-attitudes/ (summarizing a survey of 307
public and private adoption agencies in 1999 and 2000, which found that about 19% of agencies
followed religious beliefs that would reject a gay or lesbian applicant, 8% had policies of placing
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child with the biological parents unless the adopting parent is the spouse
of the biological parent and thus prevents unmarried couples from being
declared parents of the child.20 7 For many reasons, adoption is not a prac-
tical solution for couples using ART, and thus an equitable means of
determining parentage is critical.
In 2008, the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) proposed two amend-
ments to determine parentage in cases in which ART is employed.2 8
Section 2-120 applies when no gestational carrier is used, and thus the
woman who gives birth intends to be a parent of the child, while Section
2-121 covers parentage when a gestational carrier is used.209 The new
UPC sections incorporate the assumption of the 2000 and 2002 Parentage
Acts that a "third party donor" of sperm or eggs is not a parent of the
child.21° If no gestational carrier is involved, the UPC presumes that the
woman who gives birth is the mother21' and that her spouse, or another
individual who consented to the ART procedure, is the other parent.212 If
a gestational carrier is used, then UPC Section 2-121 provides that the
woman who gives birth is generally not presumed to be the mother;
213
instead, the parent-child relationship is created with an intended parent,
defined as "an individual who entered into a gestational agreement
providing that the individual will be the parent of a child born to a gesta-
tional carrier by means of assisted reproduction.
'" 214
In the same way that the Uniform Probate Code has recognized that
a single definition of "parent" will lead to unjust results if applied both to
children conceived coitally and to those conceived using ART, our citi-
zenship rules for children born abroad should acknowledge the different
ways in which children are conceived. In 1952, when the current "blood
relationship" requirement was adopted by the State Department, sperm
banks did not exist215 and no child had been conceived using in vitro
children only with married couples, and 5% were governed by state law prohibiting placement with
lesbians and gays).
207. S.J.L.. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804, 823 n.13 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (citing statutes and
cases in Nebraska, Oklahoma, North Dakota, Ohio, Wisconsin, Illinois, Georgia, and Tennessee that
have "reached our same conclusion" that adoption by the parent's same-sex partner will sever the
parent-child relationship with the first parent); see also In re T.K.J., 931 P.2d 488, 494 (Colo. App.
1996) (stating that Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-5-203 regarding stepparent adoptions required the parent
seeking to adopt to be married to the child's parent, and thus unmarried lesbian partners could not
adopt each other's children).
208. See generally Sheldon F. Kurtz & Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC Addresses the
Class-Gift and Intestacy Rights of Children of Assisted Reproduction Technologies, 35 ACTEC J.
30, 32 (2009).
209. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-120 to 2-121 (2010).
210. Id. § 2-120(b).
211. Id. § 2-120(c).
212. Id. § 2-120(d), (f).
213. Id. § 2-121(c).
214. Id § 2-121(a)(4).
215. Dr. Jerome Sherman created the world's first sperm bank in Iowa City, Iowa in 1952.
Alexis C. Madrigal, The Surprising Birthplace of the First Sperm Bank, ATLANTIC (Apr. 28, 2014,
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216fertilization. Now that children can be conceived in a variety of ways,
the State Department regulations can mean that an ART child is not only
denied U.S. citizenship but, depending on the law of the country in
which the child is born, also stateless.
CONCLUSION
Unlike the ancient Greeks and Romans, we now know (or we think
we know) how a child is created: by the mixing of genes contributed by
both a man and a woman, and the nourishment of the resulting pre-
embryo in a woman's womb. In the vast majority of cases, the woman
who nurtures and gives birth to the child is the genetic as well as the in-
tended mother. All three tests of parentage-parturient, genetic, and in-
tent-work equally well to determine maternity since they all lead to the
same woman. The problem arises when ART is used to conceive a child.
The parturient may not be the genetic mother of the child if a donated
egg or embryo is used in conception. The parturient may not be the in-
tended mother of the child if she is a gestational carrier.
The State Department's definition of a parent as solely the genetic
contributor is out of step with current American law. It is contrary to its
origins in Roman law, which regarded the parturient as something akin to
a gestational carrier: someone who nurtured the child but not one who
determined its genetic makeup. It is also out of step with centuries of
family law, in which a pure genetic connection was not the sole determi-
nant of paternity. The husband of a married woman might be declared
the child's father even though he had no blood relationship with the
child; the companion of an unmarried woman might not be declared the
child's father, even after proving the genetic connection, unless he acted
as a father in some way.
In late 2013, the State Department changed its interpretation of INA
sections 301 and 309 to recognize egg donations. While the prior posting
on the Department of State informational page stated, "[T]he U.S. citizen
parent must be the sperm or the egg donor in order to transmit U.S. citi-
zenship to a child conceived through ART,, 217 their webpage "Important
Information for U.S. Citizens Considering the Use of Assisted Reproduc-
tive Technology (ART) Abroad" now states, "[A] U.S. citizen mother
11:59 EST), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/04/how-the-first-sperm-bank-
began/361288/.
216. Louise Brown, the first child born using in vitro fertilization, was born in 1978. James
Gallagher, Five Millionth 'Test Tube Baby,' BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-
18649582?print=true (last updated July 1, 2012, 21:22 EST) (noting that the first such child, Louise
Brown, was born in the UK in July 1978, and that, since then, about five million babies have been
born using the technology).
217. U.S. Dep't of State, Important Information for US. Citizens Considering the Use of
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must be either the genetic or the gestational and legal mother of the child
at the time and place of the child's birth. (A gestational mother is the
woman who carries and gives birth to the child.) '1 8 This is a good be-
ginning, since it allows an American woman using a donated embryo to
secure American citizenship for the child she bears, even though she has
no genetic connection to the child. But much more is needed. First, the
INA sections 301 and 309 need to be amended to reflect this new policy,
and to make clear that children born before the policy change can apply
retroactively for American citizenship. Second, the new interpretation
covers children conceived with donated ova, but not children conceived
with donated sperm. The Department of State still requires, inter alia,
21 9
that the U.S. citizen father is the child's genetic parent in order for the
child to obtain American citizenship at birth through the father.
By focusing on just one factor-the blood relationship-the State
Department's policy of jus sanguinis forces us to examine the essential
attributes of parentage. Rather than articulating one test for all cases, the
rules for bestowing citizenship at birth should be amended to provide for
those conceived through ART, by allowing several presumptions of par-
entage to apply. The Uniform Probate Code amendments provide an ex-
cellent template with which to begin.
218. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 5.
219. In addition to being the genetic parent, the U.S. citizen parent must meet certain residency
requirements to transmit American citizenship to the child.
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